Code reaches the cloud metadata endpoint
HighAV-NET-006NetworkCore packNew in 2.0
What it finds
The code references a cloud instance-metadata address (169.254.169.254 or equivalent).
Why it matters
That endpoint hands out the machine's cloud credentials. Agents should never need it, and it is the first thing attackers try through SSRF.
What an attacker could do: Whoever controls this request can obtain the server's cloud credentials.
How to fix it
Remove direct metadata access from agent code, block 169.254.169.254 in outbound URL checks, and require IMDSv2 on AWS.
Pro shows the corrected code for your exact file, step by step, and re-scans to confirm the fix. See plans
Check details
- Finding code
- CLOUD_METADATA_ACCESS
- How it detects
- Looks for a specific risky pattern in the code or config.
- Confidence
- Definite: the risky setting is written plainly in the file.
- Scans
- Any text-based agent source or configuration (JS/TS/Python/JSON/YAML)
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM07 - Insecure Plugin Design
- NIST AI RMF
- MS-2.10
- SOC 2
- CC6.1, CC6.6
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- Plaintext HTTP endpointAV-NET-001 · Medium
- Permissive CORS (wildcard origin)AV-NET-002 · Medium
- Remote MCP server over unencrypted HTTPAV-MCP-110 · Medium