Server-side request to a caller-controlled URL
What it finds
The agent makes an outbound HTTP request to a URL taken directly from request, tool, or model input, with no visible host allowlist.
Why it matters
An attacker (or an injected instruction) can point the agent at internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or admin panels that are only reachable from inside your network.
What an attacker could do: Could be used to reach internal-only systems or steal cloud instance credentials from a metadata endpoint.
How to fix it
Validate every outbound URL against an explicit allowlist of hosts, block private/link-local IP ranges, and disable redirects to non-allowlisted hosts.
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Check details
- Finding code
- SSRF_RISK
- How it detects
- Looks for a risky pattern, and stays quiet when a matching safeguard is present.
- Confidence
- Likely: strong signal, but review it in context.
- Scans
- Any text-based agent source or configuration (JS/TS/Python/JSON/YAML)
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM07 - Insecure Plugin Design, LLM08 - Excessive Agency
- NIST AI RMF
- MS-2.3, MG-2.2
- SOC 2
- CC6.6, CC6.1
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Related checks
- Webhook without visible signature verificationAV-NET-003 · High
- TLS certificate verification disabledAV-NET-005 · High
- Code reaches the cloud metadata endpointAV-NET-006 · High
- Plaintext HTTP endpointAV-NET-001 · Medium
- Permissive CORS (wildcard origin)AV-NET-002 · Medium
- Remote MCP server over unencrypted HTTPAV-MCP-110 · Medium