AI workflow in CI with write-all permissions
HighAV-PERM-006PermissionsCore packNew in 2.0
What it finds
A GitHub Actions workflow that runs an AI agent grants write-all permissions to the job token.
Why it matters
The agent reads issue and PR text that anyone can write. If that text steers it, a write-all token lets it push code, change releases, or edit workflows.
What an attacker could do: A prompt in an issue or PR could lead to code being pushed to your repo.
How to fix it
Set the minimum permissions per job (for example contents: read, pull-requests: write).
Pro shows the corrected code for your exact file, step by step, and re-scans to confirm the fix. See plans
Check details
- Finding code
- CI_AGENT_WRITE_ALL
- How it detects
- Looks for a specific risky pattern in the code or config.
- Confidence
- Definite: the risky setting is written plainly in the file.
- Scans
- Any text-based agent source or configuration (JS/TS/Python/JSON/YAML)
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM08 - Excessive Agency
- NIST AI RMF
- GV-4.1
- SOC 2
- CC6.1, CC8.1
Check your agent for this
Paste your agent code or MCP config. The free scan runs all 124 checks in about 10 seconds — no account needed.
Related checks
- Overly broad cloud IAM permissionsAV-PERM-003 · Critical
- AI workflow checks out untrusted PR code with secretsAV-PERM-007 · Critical
- Agent's Kubernetes account has cluster-adminAV-PERM-008 · Critical
- No permission or tool scope declaredAV-PERM-001 · High
- Unscoped delegation detectedAV-PERM-002 · High
- LangChain SQL agent with unrestricted database accessAV-FW-002 · High