Invisible characters in tool definitions or prompts
HighAV-MCP-106MCPMCP config packNew in 2.0
What it finds
Tool definitions or prompt text contain invisible Unicode characters (zero-width, bidirectional-override, or "tag" characters).
Why it matters
Invisible characters can hide instructions that the model reads but a human reviewer cannot see. This is a known way to smuggle prompt injection past code review.
What an attacker could do: Hidden text could steer the AI in ways nobody reviewing the file can see.
How to fix it
Remove all zero-width, bidi-override and tag characters from tool descriptions and prompts, and add a CI check that rejects them.
Pro shows the corrected code for your exact file, step by step, and re-scans to confirm the fix. See plans
Check details
- Finding code
- MCP_HIDDEN_UNICODE
- How it detects
- Looks for a specific risky pattern in the code or config.
- Confidence
- Definite: the risky setting is written plainly in the file.
- Scans
- MCP client configuration files: claude_desktop_config.json, .cursor/mcp.json, .vscode/mcp.json, .mcp.json
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM01 - Prompt Injection
- NIST AI RMF
- MS-2.3
- SOC 2
- CC7.1
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Related checks
- Dangerous MCP tool exposed: shell/execAV-MCP-003 · Critical
- Dangerous MCP tool exposed: paymentsAV-MCP-008 · Critical
- Hidden instructions inside an MCP tool descriptionAV-MCP-105 · Critical
- Dangerous MCP tool exposed: filesystemAV-MCP-002 · High
- Dangerous MCP tool exposed: databaseAV-MCP-004 · High
- Dangerous MCP tool exposed: githubAV-MCP-005 · High